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EXCISES: A TIME OF REPOSE?
F. S. GILBERT* AND THEODORE R. GROOM**
"In all litigation, in all such matters of taxation, there should be
what we call a time of repose, a statute of repose."***
Something about a statute of repose normally adduces great sleep-
iness. When that statute is a tax statute, and when that tax statute
is an excise tax statute, visions of a heaven for weary technicians are
naturally conjured. It may therefore be surprising to learn that one
of the stirring tax issues of our time is whether there is a statute of
limitations for manufacturers, retailers and collected excise taxes
imposed by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The true importance of this issue can be assessed adequately only
in the context of the nature of federal excise taxes, that is, taxes which
bear no relation to the profitability of the taxpayer's business, taxes
characterized by the absence of a consistent congressional philosophy
and by a corresponding absence of a consistent administrative and
judicial interpretation.
The leading case in the area, McDonald v. United States, 1 and
its progeny' emasculated the statute of limitations for the so-called
"collected excise taxes." 3
 The broad language of these cases has led
the Internal Revenue Service and many others to speculate upon the
extension of the rationale of these decisions to the federal manu-
facturers and retailers excise taxes. The magnitude of the issue thus
raised may be measured in part by the value of the protection such
* Member, Hedrick and Lane, Washington, D.C.; B.S. cum laude 1935 University
of Florida; L.L.B. cum laude 1938 University of Florida; L.L.M. 1948 George Washington
University; Admitted to the Bars of the District of Columbia, Florida, Court of Claims
and the Supreme Court of the United States; Former attorney, Tax Division, Depart-
ment of Justice.
** Associate, Hedrick and Lane, Washington, D.C.; A.B. 1956 Bucknell University;
L.L.B. cum laude 1960 Harvard University; Admitted to the Bars of the District of
Columbia and Virginia; Former Law Clerk to Hon. Roszel C. Thomsen, Chief Judge,
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.
*** 65 Cong. Rec. 8131 (1924) (remarks of Senator Ashurst).
1 315 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1963).
2 Hulette v. United States, 315 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1963); Carter v. United States,
63-2 CCH USTC 15,535 (D.C. Decisions preceding McDonald and in accord:
People's Outfitting Co. v. United States. 58 F.2d 847 (Ct. Cl. 1932); Cohan v. United
States, 198 F. Supp. 591 (D.C. Mich. 1961).
a The "collected excise taxes" are taxes imposed by chapter 33 of the Internal
Revenue Code on facilities and services, e.g., the 20% tax imposed on amounts paid
as initiation fees and club dues to a social, athletic or sporting club. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, §. 4241. The actual taxpayer and the person having the obligation to report and
pay over the tax to the Government are different persons. For example, the club dues
tax is imposed upon the club member, but the club has the duty to collect the tax from
the member, file a return, and pay over the tax; and the communications tax is imposed
upon the telephone user, but collected by the telephone company.
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a statute of limitations would afford, for taxpayers in these three cate-
gories incur an aggregate annual liability in excess of six billion
dollars'
This article will evaluate the correctness of McDonald and sub-
sequent decisions and administrative rulings, examine the applicability'
of McDonald to federal manufacturers and retailers excises, and as-
sess the need for corrective legislation.
THE STATUTE AND THE FORM
Section 6501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 5 provides
for a three-year period of limitations on the assessment of excise taxes
by its requirement that the amount of any tax imposed by Title 26
"shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed...." Section
6501(c)(3) provides that in "the case of failure to file a return," the
tax may be assessed at any time. Thus the key to the applicability of
the three-year period of limitations depends on the delineation of ex-
actly what actions constitute the filing of a return.
Most lawyers, including that unique breed who devote their time
to tax matters, associate the term "tax return" with a form prescribed
by the Internal Revenue Service for the reporting of tax liability. In
the case of excise taxes, that schedule is Form 720, entitled "Quarterly
Federal Excise Tax Return." The detailed portion of the form is
divided by headings into major groups of excises—retailers, facilities
and services, manufacturers, and products and commodities. Under
each of these headings, specific categories of tax are itemized together
with a space for the insertion of the tax applicable to each category.
For example, the manufacturers tax on the sale of trucks imposed by
section 4061(a) is reflected under the title "Truck, bus and trailer
chassis and bodies; tractors." The form provides no space for the re-
porting of individual taxable transactions or total taxable transactions,
either by number or amount; nor is there space for the reflection of
exclusions or exemptions from the tax or for price readjustments, or
for the reporting of non-taxable transactions.
McDONALD AND OTHER CASES
One might conclude that filing a "return" is an easy matter,
requiring only that one supply the information called for on the face
of the form, sign it, and mail it to the appropriate District Director.
But, in the words of McDonald, "Not so in the case of excise taxes."'
That case involved the following fact situation. In his idle hours,
4
 I.R.S. News Release, IR-633, October 4, 1963.
5
 References to sections or to the Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
unless otherwise noted.
6
 The context is different; McDonald v. United States, supra note 1, at 800.
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Mr. McDonald whiled 'away the time at the Idle Hour Country
Club, a social club within the meaning of Section 1710 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 (the predecessor of Section 4241 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954). In 1947, McDonald purchased a $1,000 bond
from the Club. Thirteen years later, the Internal Revenue Service
claimed that the amount paid for the bond was an amount paid as an
"initiation fee" and therefore subject to the 20% tax imposed on the
payment of such fees. McDonald contested the assessment, both on
its merits and upon the ground that the assessment was barred by the
period of limitations prescribed by Section 3312(a) of the 1939 Code
(the predecessor to section 6501(a)). He pointed out that the club had
filed the prescribed excise tax return for the relevant period, which had
reflected the club dues and initiation fees tax it thought due.
The statute of limitations question presented to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was simply whether a return
had been filed in 1947 which would bar the assessment of tax in 1960.
The Government contended that no return had been filed, since the
taxable event (payment for the bond) was not reflected in the taxes
reported on the return. It was argued that the system of periodic re-
turns, rather than a separate return of each tax, was adopted by the
Internal Revenue Service for purposes of more convenient reporting,
and that this should not prevent suspension of the limitation statute
where the return failed to disclose the transaction subject to imposition
of the tax.
The court was "constrained to agree with the Government's po-
sition."' It recognized that a different rule pertained to income taxes,
but thought the situation applicable to each tax distinguishable.
The limitation statute before us (§ 3312) is different than
that applying to income taxes (§ 275, 276 I.R.C. 1939). In
the latter case, the filing of a return begins the period of limi-
tation; the taxes must be assessed "within three years after
the return was filed." The filing of a return starts the running
of the statute. Not so in the case of excise taxes. The assess-
ment must be made "within four years after such taxes be-
come due," provided a "return" was timely filed.' (Emphasis
in original.)
The court was undaunted by the drastic consequences which re-
sulted from its decision.
Having in mind the admitted good faith of McDonald and
his Club, and the thirteen years that the government delayed
7 McDonald v. United States, supra note 1, at 800.
8 Ibid.
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in making the assessment, it would appear that our holding
frustrates the traditional purpose of a limitations statute....
Under the view we express, the door is open for the govern-
ment to go back, without limit in time, and make assessments
against citizens who honestly believed they had made all the
returns and paid all the taxes that the law required. We may
not, however, extend the statute here involved beyond its
clear language. The good faith of the taxpayer in failing to
file a return cannot aid them here.... The absence of any
limitation, under the situation before us, may indeed visit
unfair burdens and expense upon innocent taxpayers. If so,
Congress can provide the needed remedy"
Both the rationale of the court's decision, based upon the trans-
actional nature of the excise tax, and the broad language of the opinion
are on their face equally applicable to non-collected excises, the manu-
facturers and retailers excises. This was recognized, or at least as-
sumed, by the dissenting judge:
The Court concedes that a good faith income tax return,
although erroneously excluding certain includable items of in-
come, nevertheless suffices to start the running of the income
tax statute of limitations. But in refusing to apply that good
faith rule to the excise tax statute of limitations, the Court
holds that no statute of limitations applies to unreported tax-
able items erroneously omitted from a composite excise tax
return.
Federal excise taxes apply to innumerable goods and services.
Literally hundreds of other particular items, otherwise tax-
able, might arguably fall within the many statutory exemp-
tions of various classes of such items. See 26 U.S.C.A.
§ § 4001-5801.'
The dissenting judge also rejected the majority's distinction be-
tween the income tax statute of limitations and the excise tax statute
of limitations. He held that the filing of a composite return erroneously
omitting certain items in good faith constitutes the filing of a "return"
within the meaning of Section 3312(b) of the 1939 Code and that con-
sequently, the filing of such a good faith return suffices to start the run-
ning of the statute of limitations on the erroneously omitted items.
Four days later, the Sixth Circuit followed McDonald in Hulette
v. United States." Like McDonald, Hulette involved the applicability
9 Id. at 801.
10 Id. at 801-02. The sections of the 1939 Code cited include manufacturers and
retailers excises.
11 315 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1963), supra note 2.
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of the initiation fees tax imposed by the 1939 Code to transactions in
club securities with a substantial lapse of time between the taxable
transaction (1949) and the assessment of tax (1960). The court noted
the existence of one factual difference between Hulette and McDonald:
. . . In McDonald, the excise tax return form (Treasury De-
partment Form 729) called for reporting "club dues" and
"initiation fees" in separate categories. In this case, the form
used (Treasury Department Form 720) combined "club dues,
initiation fee, life memberships," and called for one total
figure. We do not consider that this difference in fact requires
a legal result different from the McDonald case.'
The court also declined to accord significance to the fact that Mr.
Hulette had apparently paid an excise tax on dues during the same
period that the taxable initiation fee was paid, so that the return filed
by the dub actually reflected the payment of a tax for the taxpayer
in the category of "club dues, initiation fees, life memberships."
Seemingly intent upon proving that bad news comes in threes, a
district court decision following the McDonald and Hulette decisions
rounded out the year 1963. In Carter v. United States,'3 the rule was
expressed broadly:
The statute of limitations does not commence to run in an
excise tax matter until the specific transaction subject to tax
is reported on the appropriate return.
The Carter court did not even cite the applicable provision of law, even
though the issue before it involved an interpretation of Section 6501
of the 1954 Code, rather than the 1939 Code provisions construed in
the prior cases. While the court in McDonald thought the different
limitations provisions of the 1939 Code pertaining to income and excise
taxes significant, no importance was attached in Carter to the fact that
the 1954 Code had obliterated this distinction While the question be-
fore the court involved a collected excise tax, the rule was stated to
apply to "an excise tax matter." The court also indicated that the
transaction must be reflected on "an appropriate return," possibly rul-
ing out the reflection of the transaction on an income tax return filed by
the same taxpayer. Finally, the court spoke of a "transaction" reported
on a return, evidently ignoring the fact that excise tax returns never
call for the reporting of transactions, but only for the reporting of tax.
The year 1963 was not the only bad year for judicial logic. In
1961, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
12
 Hulette v. United States, supra note 2, at 828.
13 63-2 CCH USTC	 15,535 (D.C. Ill.), supra note 2.
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Michigan ruled that section 6501 did not bar the assessment of club
dues not reflected by a return filed by the Detroit Yacht Club." Ignor-
ing the fact that statutes of limitation are customarily intended to bar
the collection of debts not previously paid, the court thought, "It would
seem strange indeed to hold that the statutory period of limitations
had run as to taxes otherwise required to be paid but which were
omitted from such return." The rationale was the same as that followed
in McDonald:
The club dues tax is a divisible tax; each charge made for the
use of a club facility constitutes a taxable transaction.... A
failure to report a taxable transaction where the tax involved
is divisible and a combined tax return is used permits the
commissioner to assess the deficiency at any time since the
statute of limitation has not started to run."
Cohan relied upon a 1932 case, People's Outfitting Co. v. United
States,'° which interpreted the statute of limitations of the Revenue
Act of 1924 as applied to the tax imposed on the retail sale of jewelry.
While the People's Outfitting case had held that the return was fraud-
ulently filed (thus making it immaterial whether a return had actually
been filed), it also had held that no return was made of sales "upon
which it is agreed no tax was paid.' As shall be seen, the Internal
Revenue Service has ignored the holding of the People's Outfitting Co.
case for more than 30 years.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION
For essentially the same reasons as were articulated in McDonald
et al., the Internal Revenue Service has held that the statute of limi-
tations on collected excise taxes does not commence to run where the
taxpayer fails or refuses to pay the tax, even though the collecting
agency has filed timely returns of like taxes paid by other taxpayers
for the same period. If, however, the collecting agency places the
Government on notice that the taxpayer "fails or refuses" to pay the
tax, the bar of the statute applies." In the case of manufacturers and
retailers excises, however, an entirely different set of rules is followed.
These directives have been evolved in a series of published rulings,"
which are integrated and summarized in the following paragraph.
Where a Form 720 is filed reflecting the payment of tax with re-
14 Cohan v. United States, supra note 2.
16 Id. at 601-02.
16 58 F.2d 847 (Ct. Cl. 1932), supra note 2.
14 Id. at 851.
18 Rev. Rul. 59-127, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 656.
19 Rev. Rul. 60-312, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 398; Rev. Rul. 59-366, 1959-2 Cum. Bull.
418; Rev. Rul. 58-274, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 459.
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spect to any category of tax (e.g., "Truck," "bus," etc.), a return is
filed with respect to that category even though tax is erroneously, but
in good faith, omitted on transactions within the same category. Where
the word "none," a zero, or some like denial of liability is made with
respect to all taxes in the summary portion of. the Form 720, or where
such a negative entry is made on any line of the return, a return is
filed with respect to the class or particular item indicated. If no nega-
tive entry is made on a Form 720, a return is not filed for any category
of tax in which the space opposite the category is left blank, even
though the tax may have been reported for another category.
Thus while the Internal Revenue Service is in accord with the rule
of McDonald in collected excise tax cases, it has not yet applied this
rule to manufacturers and retailers excises. As shall be seen, however,
even this somewhat more moderate position robs the statute of the
vitality which Congress intended it to have.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF EXCISE LIMITATION
PROVISIONS
A. Statutory Provisions and Committee Report
Although all earlier Revenue Acts contained provisions relating
to returns, the first statutory provision limiting the period in which an
assessment could be made for excise taxes was enacted in the Revenue
Act of 1921. This period of limitations was first meshed with the filing
of a return in the Revenue Act of 1924. For example, Section 38 of the
Revenue Act of 1909 (fifth paragraph) provided a penalty of 50
per cent of the tax "in the case of refusal or neglect to make a return";
similarly, penalties have been written into every subsequent major
revenue act for the failure to file a return. Sections 9 and 14 of the
Revenue Act of 1916 contained a period of limitations on the assess-
ment of income taxes levied by that act, which provided in effect that
the Commissioner was required to make all assessments on or before
June 1 of the year succeeding the taxable year "except in cases of re-
fusal or neglect to make such return and in case of erroneous, false,
or fraudulent returns," in which case the Commissioner could make a
return and an assessment thereon "at any time within three years after
said return is due, or has been made...."
Section 1322 of the Revenue Act of 1921 20 established a statute
20 The Revenue Act of 1917 imposed "war excise taxes" upon the sale of auto-
mobiles and other named articles by the manufacturer, producer, or importer thereof.
Section 601 of that Act provided for the making of returns by these taxpayers and
specified that such returns should "contain such information and be made at such
times and in such manner as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval
of the. Secretary of the Treasury, may by regulations prescribe." A similar provision
was contained in section 903 of the Revenue Act of 1918 which imposed a wide variety
of manufacturers excises.
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of limitations for the assessment of excise taxes, estate taxes and all
other taxes imposed by the Act, except income, excess-profits, and war-
profits taxes. Section 1322 provided as follows:
SEC. 1322. That all internal revenue taxes, except as pro-
vided in section 250 of this Act, shall, notwithstanding the
provisions of section 3182 of the Revised Statutes or any other
provision of law, be assessed within four years after such
taxes became due, but in the case of fraud with intent to
evade tax or willful attempt in any manner to defeat or evade
tax, such tax may be assessed at any time.
Section 1320 of the Act proscribed the bringing of a suit for the col-
lection of excise, estate, and other taxes "after the expiration of five
years from the time such tax was due" except in the case of fraud or
willful evasion. While the period of limitations for assessment and col-
lection of excise taxes began to run irrespective of the filing of a re-
turn, section 3176 of the Revised Statutes did provide a penalty of 25
per cent for the failure to file an excise tax return without reasonable
cause.
Section 250(d) of the 1921 Act imposed a less restrictive rule in
the case of income taxes, providing that the assessment was to be made
"within four years after the return was filed," and that in the case "of
a failure to file a required return, the amount of tax due may be deter-
mined, assessed, and collected, and a suit or proceeding for the col-
lection of such amount may be begun, at any time after it becomes
due...."
Under the caption "RETURNS," section 1307 of the 1921 Act
provided:
SEC. 1307. That whenever in the judgment of the Com-
missioner necessary he may require any person, by notice
served upon him, to make a return or such statements as he
deems sufficient to show whether or not such person is liable
to tax.
The reasons for the enactment of sections 1322 and 1320 are ex-
plained in the report of the Senate Finance Committee:
The laws relating to the time within which assessments may
be made, suits brought for the collection of taxes, refunds or
credits for taxes filed, and court actions instituted for the
recovery of taxes illegally or erroneously collected have in
the past been uncertain and annoying to taxpayers.
By section 1322 of this bill the time for the making of an as-
sessment increase of taxes other than income, excess profits,
war-profits, or corporation excise taxes under the Act of
30
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August 5, 1909, has been limited to four years after the tax
became due. In section 250(d) the time for assessing income,
excess-profits, and war-profits taxes under this bill has been
limited to four years, and under prior Acts to five years.
Section 1320 of this bill prevents the bringing of any suit or
proceeding by the Government in any court for the collection
of internal-revenue taxes after the expiration of five years
from the time such tax was due, except in the case of fraud.'
In the Revenue Act of 1924, however, the statute of limitations
pertaining to excise, estate and other taxes was changed to conform
more closely to the provisions of the income tax statute of limitations.
Thus, subsection (b) of Section 1009 of the Revenue Act of 1924 pro-
vided that in case "of a failure to file a required return" of excise taxes,
the tax might be assessed, or a proceeding for collection might be be-
gun, at any time.
The reports of the House and Senate Committees regarding the
reason for the more stringent section 1009 are unenlightening.' The
Committees do discuss, however, the reasons for making a correspond-
ing change in the estate tax statute of limitations, contained in section
310(a) of the 1924 Act. In explaining this change from prior law
(which was the same for both excise and estate taxes), the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means stated:
The only limitations upon the assessment and collection of
estate taxes at present are the general limitations in sections
1320 and 1322 of the existing law. These are four years from
the time the tax became due in the case of assessments and
five years from the time the tax became due in case of suits or
proceedings for collection. These provisions as now worded
have been found particularly undesirable in the case of estate
taxes in view of the fact that if no returns are filed by estates
the Treasury Department had no knowledge of the tax li-
ability until the periods of limitation, which run from the date
the tax became due, have expired. For these reasons, it is pro-
posed to start the running of the statute in estate tax cases
from the date the return is filed. In other words, the period of
limitation will not begin to run until the Department has in-
formation upon which it can proceed to determine and assess
21 S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
22 These reports state that, "Substantially similar provisions occur in sections 1320
and 1322 of the existing law." H. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924); S. Rep.
No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). As is evident, this statement is not accurate,
inasmuch as the 1924 Act requires the filing of a return as a condition to the running
of the period of limitations.
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the amount of tax and, if necessary, institute suit for its col-
lection.'
The Revenue Act of 1924 also expanded the provisions relating to
the collection of income tax to provide that in the case of a failure to
file a return, a collection of any income tax could be begun at any time
without assessment. The following is an excerpt from the discussion on
the Senate floor regarding the change:
MR. SMOOT. Anyone who wants to attempt any fraud
with the Government ought to be put on notice. We are
claiming here that the Government must be put on notice.
MR. FLETCHER. I think you ought to insert the words
"with such intent" after the word "failure," so as to read,
"or of a failure with such intent to file a return."
MR. SMOOT. The Government of the United States may
not have notice at all. It may have no chance whatever to
protect itself.
MR. FLETCHER. But here you are providing that in case
of failure to file a return the Government is authorized to
proceed in court at once for collection of such taxes without
any assessment at any time.
MR. GEORGE. The real effect of the amendment is simply
to relieve from any statute of limitations a mere failure to
make a return. That is all it is. That is what it does clearly.'
This discussion clearly indicates that the purpose of the amendment
was to protect the Government by requiring that notice be given it by
the filing of a return. In other words, notice is the principal ingredient
of a return.
While the 1924 legislation was under consideration by Congress,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued S.T. 446, III-1 Cum. Bull. 463
(1924), interpreting section 903 of the 1921 Act relating to excise
taxes. Contained in the ruling is the following statement:
Careful reading of section 903 discloses that the tax is to be
returned and paid upon the basis of monthly periods. Each
month therefore constitutes a separate and distinct taxable
period. For the purpose of collection the amount due for each
month constitutes therefore a separate tax.
S.T. 446 related to a taxpayer who had apparently filed his excise
tax returns but failed to report the tax on certain sales. It is significant
that the Bureau of Internal Revenue did not find that there was a
23 11. Rep. No. 179, supra note 22.
24 65 Cong. Rec., 7133 (1924).
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"failure to file a return" but merely that the taxpayer had filed "im-
proper returns." Moreover, it is categorically stated in S.T. 446 that
each month constitutes a separate and distinct taxable period and that
for the purpose of collection, the amount due each month constitutes
a separate tax.
Sections 1009(a) and 1009(b) of the Revenue Act of 1924 contain
essentially the same language as subsections (a) and (b) of Section
3312 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Similarly, section 277(a) (1)
of the 1924 Act and section 275(a) of the 1939 Code, pertaining to
income taxes, contain basically the same language, and provide that
income taxes should be assessed within three years "after the return
was filed," while the sections relevant to excise taxes in the 1924 Act
and the 1939 Code provide ,that taxes must be assessed within four
years "after such taxes became due" (emphasis supplied), except in
cases of fraud or failure to file a return.
While, as has been seen, 25
 the Sixth Circuit thought this difference
to be of some importance, it would appear that no significance was
intended by Congress, particularly since the provisions pertaining
to income and excise limitations in the 1924 Act and the 1939 Code
(sections 278(a) and 1009(b) of the 1924 Act, section 276(a) and
section 3312(b) of the 1939 Code, respectively) both provided that
in the case of a failure to file a return, the tax might be assessed at any
time. In the 1954 Code, all statute of limitations provisions were con-
solidated into section 6501, and the difference between the "taxes be-
came due" and "return was filed" language was resolved in favor of
the latter.
B. Evaluation of Legislative History
McDonald and its progeny distinguished between the effect of the
income tax statute of limitations and the excise tax statute, principally
because the income tax is imposed upon net income during a given
period while the excise tax is a transactions tax. This distinction may be
somewhat misleading. While it is common to say that the income tax
is imposed upon income and that the excise tax is imposed upon sales
(or uses), both taxes are in reality imposed upon persons, and the
totality of transactions by the person has an effect upon the tax liability
of the person for any given period, whether the period is a statutory
one, as in the case of the income tax, or a reporting period established
as a matter of "convenience," as in the case of the excise tax. While,
as noted above, the Government currently places great emphasis on
the transactional nature of excise taxes, this is a relatively recent
policy, for a ruling issued contemporaneously with the enactment
26 McDonald v. United States, supra note 1.
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of the 1924 Act considered the excise tax to be imposed for a given
period.
In any event, the striking features about the historical develop-
ment of the Revenue Acts relating to the excise period of limitations
are that the initial excise statute of limitations was enacted in 1921
to change the past law that was "uncertain and annoying to taxpayers";
that the limitations provisions enacted in 1921 were more favorable
to the excise taxpayer than to the income taxpayer; and that the
changes made in 1924 were made merely to make the excise tax pro-
visions conform to the income tax provisions.
The reports of the House and Senate Committees, supra, relating
to the reason for conditioning the running of the limitations period
on the filing of a return are significant. In simple terms, the Treasury
was hard put to assess a deficiency in the estate tax unless it was known
that a taxpayer had died, and had transferred property upon his death.
Similarly, it would be difficult for the Department to assess a deficiency
in excises unless it was known that a person was in the business of
manufacturing, of making retail sales, or of operating a social club.
It is appropriate to note, however, that the last sentence of the com-
mittee report is troublesome. That sentence provided that the period
will not begin to run "until the Department has information upon
which it can proceed to determine and assess the amount of tax. . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.) 20
 A fair reading of this sentence is that in
order for the statute to run, the Department must be made aware of
the transfer of property by death, and having been made so aware, it
may then examine the books, records and other relevant data of the
taxpayer and proceed to determine the correctness of the tax reported
and, if in error, assess additional tax. This notice conception of the
function of a return is confirmed by the Senate Floor debates quoted
above.
There is other evidence in the early Revenue Acts that Congress
considered a "return" simply to be information supplied by the tax-
payer, in compliance with a form prescribed by the Commissioner,
showing whether a person is liable for tax. For example, section
1002 (a) of the 1924 Act like section 6001 of the present Code provides
that every person liable for tax shall "make such returns . . . as the
Commissioner . . . may from time to time prescribe." And section
1002(b) of the 1924 Act allows the Commissioner to "require any
person . . . to make a return . . . as the Commissioner deems sufficient
to show whether or not such person is liable to tax." (Emphasis
supplied.)
It would seem, then, that Congress merely intended to require the
26
 H. Rep. No. 179, supra note 22.
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filing of a properly executed form that contained the information
prescribed by the Commissioner. In the case of excises, Form 720 and
prior excise forms have never required the reporting of each trans-
action or of any detailed information. As the Service has said, and
correctly so:
[W]here the Internal Revenue Service has adopted for
use by taxpayers a return form which calls for somewhat
detailed information and which, when properly executed, will
provide the Service with a means of accurately auditing the
tax computation, a question may arise as to whether the in-
formation furnished by any particular taxpayer is sufficient
to qualify the form as a complete return. See Commissioner
v. Lane-Wells Company, 321 U.S. 219. Ct. D. 1602, C.B.
1944, 539. However, a properly executed Form 720 does not
require detailed information and does not provide a basis for
independent verification of the tax computation. Only by in-
spection of the records and accounts required to be main-
tained by the person required to file the return can the accu-
racy of a return on Form 720 be verified by the Service. Thus,
the question of sufficient information can have little or no
application to Form 720. It is the mere entry of the amount
of the tax liability on the appropriate line which determines
that the person submitting the form has filed a return for
the category or categories of tax listed on that line."
It is apparent that Form 720 has never been intended to be a
return of transactions, but only a return of tax. The requirement of
the statute, then, is not that the taxpayer has filed a return of trans-
actions, but that he has filed a return of tax.
It would be absurd, of course, to require that, in order to be
considered a return for purposes of the statute of limitations, the
return filed has to be correct as judged in the light of all subsequent
events. Needless to say, if a taxpayer has filed such a return, he
needs no statute of repose. Again, the Service does not prescribe
any such requirement. It merely requires, in the words of the certifi-
cation contained on the Form 720, that the return "to the best of
my knowledge and belief is a true, correct and complete return."
In its simplest terms, the issue is thus whether Congress intended
that excise taxpayers have a meaningful statute of repose. The Sixty-
eighth Congress, which enacted the excise limitations provision in
substantially its present form, was the same Congress that enacted
Section 1008(b) of the Revenue Act of 1924 (now known as Section
27
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1108(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926) to prevent retroactive assess-
ment of excise taxes where a taxpayer has parted with possession of
of an article, without collecting tax, relying upon a ruling, regulation
or Treasury decision that the article is not taxable. The Sixty-eighth
was a Congress concerned about harassment by revenue agents, un-
necessary examinations of taxpayers (section 1005), reopening of
closed matters (section 1006), and excessive administrative review
(section 1007). The mood of this Congress is expressed by the fol-
lowing statements made on the Senate floor:
MR. CARAWAY:
There should come a time when the taxpayer will be free
from being harassed. As it is, he never knows whether his
settlement will be accepted or not. Two or three or four years
after the records are destroyed, some agent comes along and
says that the taxpayer owes something else. The Government,
like an individual, ought to be bound by a settlement where
the payment is made on the advice of its agent."
MR. McKELLAR:
One of the most unpopular attributes, if I may call it
that, of any tax measure is the attribute that the taxpayer
never knows when he is through . . . [the taxpayer] ought
not to be constantly menaced with opening and reopening
of tax matters. . . .
Oh no; a taxpayer never knows when he gets through. A
corporation or individual doing business may have settled
his taxes for five years previously, but he does not know when
some inspector or accountant for the Government is going to
come back to reassess him for taxes five years previously.
There ought to be some limitation. It is unfair to the tax-
payer as it now stands. It is not provided for in the succeeding
section, section 1106, to which the Senator from Utah
refers."
MR. ASHURST:
I believe that if there be one thing that has tended to
throw reproach upon the income-tax system it is the feeling
that although a taxpayer may pay, and he may make an
honest attempt to adjust his taxes, he is never certain that he
is through. There are domiciliary visits, agents, letters coming
to him saying his tax is not settled yet.
In all litigation, in all such matters as taxation, there
28 65 Cong. Rec. 7129 (1924.).
28 65 Cong. Rec. 8127 (1924).
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should be what we call a time of repose, a statute of repose.
Business, in my judgment, does not object to paying high
taxes when it is necessary, and such are necessary; but
business does object, and business has a right to object, to
being constantly harassed."
It is unthinkable that a Congress concerned about harassment by
revenue agents for the past periods within the statutory period, con-
cerned about retroactive assessment of excise taxes, and concerned
about the need for certainty in business operations would enact
a statute of limitations for excise taxpayers that is more mirage
than substance.
Thus, the legislative history of section 6501 strongly indicates
that the excise tax period of limitations commences to run with
respect to all categories of federal excise tax contained on Form 720
whenever a taxpayer executes a Form 720 for the same period and
indicates thereon the presence or absence of liability for any category
of tax, and where such information is true, complete and accurate
to the best of the taxpayer's knowledge and belief. Such history of
section 6501 conclusively indicates that, at the very least, assessment
of excise tax is proscribed, in the case of manufacturers and retailers
excises, according to the standards contained in Revenue Ruling
60-312, supra, and other current published statements of position
by the Internal Revenue Service.
RECOMMENDATIONS
One of the principal measures of the fairness of any set of legal
rules is whether they afford reasonable certainty of liability. In tax
matters, where the burden of proving the absence of liability is on
the taxpayer, it is essential that there be a time when the taxpayer is
no longer required to retain records and other sources of evidence
indicating his absence of liability. In business taxation, particularly
excise taxation, a date should arrive when the taxpayer knows what
his contingent liabilities are so that he may evaluate his ability to
expand his business activities, distribute the profits of the business
to its owners, determine wage and pricing policies, and conduct the
normal operations of business. In collected excise matters, where the
taxpayer and the person having the legal obligation to report tax
are different persons and, as a result, the taxpayer often has little
awareness of the presence or absence of tax liability, equally cogent
reasons require that there be a time of repose.
It is clear from the legislative history of the excise tax statute of
limitations that Congress intended excise taxpayers to be protected
30 65 Cong. Rec. 8131 (1924).
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from assessments of tax on transactions occurring in the distant past.
This legislative history has not even been alluded to by courts adjudi-
cating the issue. Nevertheless, the many decisions rendered in igno-
rance of this congressional purpose have cast considerable doubt upon
the existence of an effective statute of limitations for excises.
It is understood that the Internal Revenue Service is presently
studying the implications of the McDonald line of decisions on its
published administrative position. It is hoped that in this era of fair
and impartial administration of the tax laws the Service will, at the
very least, adhere to its present published position regarding the
applicability of section 6501 to federal manufacturers and retailers
excises. Still, it is recognized, that there are practical limitations which
may prevent the Service from announcing a correct interpretation of
section 6501 as applied to all categories of excises, for this would
entail a rejection of McDonald and a modification of its previous
rulings in the manufacturers and retailers area.
Congress should therefore consider legislation to make it clear
that the good faith filing of Form 720 indicating the presence or absence
of liability for any category of tax is the filing of a return with respect
to all categories of tax sufficient to commence the running of the period
of limitations prescribed by section 6501. At the same time, a provision
might be considered which would extend the period of assessment
beyond the three-year period in those cases where a certain percentage
of tax is omitted from the return. As is well known, the income tax
provisions provide ample precedents for such a provision.
Only with the adoption of a clarifying statutory provision may a
lawyer confidently assure a client (say, for example, the Virginia
Country Club), "Yes, Virginia, there is an excise tax statute of
limitations."
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